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1. Introduction
The Pythagorean tradition dominates the understanding of beauty up
until the end of the eighteenth century. According to this tradition, the
experience of beauty is stimulated by cenain relations perceived to
obtain between an object/construct's elements. As a result, the object
ofthe experience ofbeauty is indeterminate: it has neither adeterminate
perceptual analogue (one cannot simply identify beauty as one can a
straight line or a particular shape) nor a determinate concept (there are
no necessary and sufficient conditions for beauty at the semantic
level). By the thineenth century in the West, the pleasure experienced
in beauty is characterised as disinterested. Yet, on the basis that all
cultural manifestations of the Pythagorean theory of beauty recognise
that judgments of beauty are genuine judgments, we would want to
say that judgments of beauty are 'lawful'. In addition, from ancient
times, up until after Kant, philosophers of beauty within this tradition
recognise two kinds of beauty: a universal, unchanging beauty co-
existing with a relative, dynamic beauty.2 These two kinds of beauty
and the tensions discussed above. are reconciled and dissolved
respectively, according to the metaphysical/religious commitments of
the particular author. As yet, however, these features of beauty have
not been reconciled within a physicalist worldview. lllis is what I set
out to do.
The aim of this paper, then, is to outline a way of thinking about
beauty which resolves these apparent contradictions. An explanatory
hypothesis for beauty is developed, which draws upon recent
developments in cognitive science.3 A theory of perception needs to
satisfy cenain conditions in order to explain the features of heauty in
such a way that they are complementary rather than dichotomous. lllis
paper begins by uncovering the nature of these conditions, and
considering whether contemporary theories ofperception satisfy them.
Finally, an outline of a new way of thinking about heauty emerges,
whose relevance for understanding contemporary an is then examined.
But first, a brief history of beauty is in order.
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2. The Pythagorean Tradition of Beauty4
... the rays of the noumefUll world jiltering through the phenomenal
world
In the above quotation, Robert Zimmerman5 is referring to the aesthetic
experience according to Immanuel Kant. The noumenal world is the
world as it objectively is, independent of our perceptions of it: the
world as we can never know it. The phenomenal world is the world as
it appears to us: we can only know the world through the constraints
imposed by our perceptual apparatus. However, according to
Zimmerman's interpretation of Kant, the aesthetic experience allows
us to glimpse something of the noumenal world. This idea reflects
something of the 'otherworldly' feel to the aesthetic experience: the
'hard to characterise' quality of beauty.
This peculiar quality of our experience of beauty is reflected in the
explanations of beauty given throughout history. For example, in
ancient times, beauty was interpreted as connecting the perceiver with
a consciousness or a state of being which existed beyond the material
world. According to Plato, beauty, though instantiated in objects, was
a transcendent entity. The phenomenology of beauty highlights that
paradox ofbeauty which the hypothesis presented in this paper attempts
to explain. The paradox, as evidenced in Plato's Phaedms, is that the
perception ofbeauty, though apparently the perception ofaproperty of
particular objects, at the same time feels as though it is a recognition of
some greater truth about the nature of things: a truth already known a
priori by the perceiver.
In medieval times, the perception of beauty was understood to
facilitate self-transcendence; a feeling of being in harmony with others
or something beyond the self.6 It was believed that the experience
of beauty connected the individual to the divine. However, against
this universal subjective response to beauty, was the objective nature
of beauty. Just as, according to Plato (and Aristotle)'? beauty was
manifested in objects as an organic unity, according to Thomas Aquinas,
beauty manifested itsel fin objects and events as an order and harmony.8
Kant's construal of the problem of beauty as involving an antinomy
caused by the apparent subjectivity and universality of heauty had
previously emerged in the work of ancient and medieval thinkers. That
is, it was recognised that the experience of beauty involved a certain
type of response and a certain type of stimulus. The stimulus evoked a
perceptual harmony and order because of the constitution of its parts.
By the medieval period, the response to this perceptual harmony and
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order was already being characterised as a pure and disinterested
pleasure.9
The true nature of beauty was a central philosophical question in
eighteenth-century philosophy. The ideas on the subject developed at
this time are most notably formulated by David Hume,lO and Kant. 11
During this period, the experience of beauty is ultimately associated
with a particular kind of perceptual act of a particular type of object.
usually an art object or an object of nature. However, Hume and Kant
emphasise different aspects of the interaction between the perceiver
and the object judged to be beautiful. According to Hume, the perception
ofbeauty involves acertain response on the part of the perceiver which
is conditional on the perceiver having a sense of beauty. However, his
actual identification of beauty tends to direct us towards searching the
beautiful object for its defining characteristics. According to Hume:
Beauty is such an order and constitution of parts as either by the
primary constitution of our nature, by custom. or by caprice is filled to
give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul. I2
Kant, on the other hand, directs our attention to reasoning what
perceptual/cognitive conditions must exist in the perceiver in order to
explain the way in which we experience beauty. For example, he
reasoned that the basis of a disinterested pleasure must be universal as
no personal grounds come into it. This led into his speculation regarding
the origins of the universality of judgments of beauty. According to
Kant, the judgment of beauty can be thought of as universal because
the basis of the experience of beauty is perceptual form and this basis
is intersubjective. So Kant provides a lawful basis to judgments of
beauty without providing necessary and sufficient conditions for beauty
at the semantic level. The antinomy that Kant sets out to solve is
represented by Mary Mothersill l3 as a matter of needing to reconcile
two apparently contradictory theses. These are (first thesis) that there
are no principles of beauty (no properties in the object which are
logically necessary and sufficient to an object being beautiful); and
(second thesis) that there are genuine judgments of beauty. I call
Mothersill's first thesis the ineffability thesis, and her second thesis
the lawful thesis. Mothersill suggests at one point that if principles of
beauty were neurophysiological or psychological conditions 14 then
there would be grounds for genuine judgments of beauty which do not
translate into properties in the object which are logically necessary and
sufficient to an object being judged beautiful. She writes:
... aesthetic theory ... requires definitions and principles ... however
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there is no reason to suppose that the principles must be principles of
taste; and the supposition that the definitions of art or beauty that
philosophers have advanced are designed to promulgate principles of
taste appears simply to be false. 15
3. Three Conditions of a Unified Theory of Beauty
If we understand principles of beauty, not as properties in the object,
but as principles which underlie the perceptual processes employed
in the perception of certain objects, then there would be principles
of beauty which do not lock us into the idea that there are stateable
sufficient conditions for beauty. That is, we could think of beauty as a
relational property existing in the object by virtue of there being certain
processes involved in the perceptual apparatus of the perceiver, of
which she becomes aware in the course ofperceiving beautiful objects.
In this way, the clements within Kant's antinomy as well as the two
theses identified by Mothersill would be reconciled. A judgment of
beauty could be understood to be both universal and subjective based
on the fact that the experience of beauty is an awareness of species-
specific perceptual processes or principles. If an awareness of these
principles were pleasurable in themselves, it would be a disinterested
pleasure, quite distinct from pleasure of the sensuous or pleasure
experienced in the good. While there would be no principles which
translate into necessary or sufficient conditions for beauty at the
semantic level, there would still be grounds for genuine judgments of
beauty. Hence beauty's universality (lawfulness) and subjectivity
(ineffability) would be complementary features of beauty.
The title of this paper suggests that I will be providing an outline or
approach to a theory of beauty which will encompass all manifestations
of beauty. The problem emerges, however, that if we explain beauty
according to an awareness ofcertain perceptual principles, the possibility
of mathematical, scientific, moral and intellectual beauty would seem
to he precluded. In order to accommodate these kinds of beauty within
the explanation provided for perceptual beauty, perceptual principles
would need to figure, either analogously or in some parallel way, in
higher level judgments of a cognitive kind.
In order, then, to accommodate the idea of beauty emerging here, a
perceptual theory would need to (i) include a stage of perceptual
processing that was responsible for the construction of perceptual
form, which we could validly distinguish from other operations and
processes; (ii) posit principles or assumptions about the physical
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world embedded in the system which constrained the constmction of
perceptualform and were accessible to consciousness; and (iii) include
the possibility that perceptual principles could figure in, either
analogously or in some parallel way, higher level judgments of a
cognitive kind.
3.1 The First Condition of a unified theory of beauty:
perceptual form
In this paper I use vision as my model of perception for two reasons.
First, there is more research carried out on vision than on other
perceptual modules and, second, the visual arts are my favoured an
form for discussion. I could add a third reason, that vision is para-
digmatic ofhow perception operates but that would demand the kind of
argument and evidence for which there is no room here. For the
purposes of this paper, let us assume that both the auditory and the
haptic perceptual modules involve form-making principles analogous
to vision. 16
The problem of vision is to work out how our cogniti ve systems can
arrive at a reliable interpretation of the world from the varying light
intensities that hit the retina (the equivalent problem in sound is how
we hear word-sounds instead of letter-sounds or whole sounds like
passages of music rather than just the elemental auditory vibrations
which make up the sound). The mathematician and neuroscientist
David Marr, in an attempt to solve this prohlem for vision, envisaged
the visual system as an ascending hierarchy of representations,
which were data driven and largely bottom up. Put very simply, Marr's
idea was that the perceptual system groups pixels of light of similar
intensity and close proximity into angles, lines, shapes. With the help
of constraints imposed by inbuilt assumptions about how the world is,
these elements are further decoded and transformed into representations
which provide information about shapes/forms and their position
within space. Because ofthe speed at which we extract this information,
and the automatic and mandatory nature of this process, Marr reasoned
that this transformation from the retinocentric image into a 3D image
must operate, by and large, independently of processes which draw
upon explicit higher level knowledge (semantic and naming). This
assumption is supported by evidence that humans can perceive shapes
in depth without prior knowledge (Dela JuJesz stereograms).17
Furthermore, Marr drew upon the work of the psychologists E. K.
Warrington and P. Rabin 18 whose study of patients with parietal
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lesions found that it was possible to recover the 3D shape of an object
which projected an uncharacteristic angle to the viewer even when the
patient had no accessible semantic or naming knowledge of the object. 19
Marr concluded that vision can solve the problem of building a
description ofshape and positions ofobjects from images. independently
ofobject recognition.20 Further evidence for a separation of structural.
semantic and naming stages is provided by neuropsychological studies
conducted more recently by Glyn Humphreys et al. This evidence
supports the idea that vision is made up of a number of small modules,
'at least in so far as the processing of independent specifiable image
properties is concerned (for example, depth and motion being separated
from the processing of form)'.21 Colour is significant at this level in
providing information about tone (much as Cezanne relied on the
jux1apositioning of certain colours to create the illusion of form; the
colours in his paintings are not characteristically chosen for their
sensuous properties). Clearly distinguishing form-construction as a
distinct perceptual process, which is a reasonably safe assumption to
make. is the first stage in establishing the possibility of perceptual
prinCiples of fonn-construction.
3.2 Principles of perceptual form: the second condition
What is important is whether there can rightly be understood to be
principles of fonn embedded in the visual system's operations of
which we can become aware in a limited kind of way (in the sense
that we cannot be aware of their source phenomenologically and we
cannot accurately match them with language schemata). This would
explain how these principles can be universal-subjective, and lawful-
ineffable. It would also explain why the object of an experience of
beauty is indeterminate both perceptually and conceptually, given
that the principles of which we become aware in an experience of
beauty would constitute a part of the architecture of the mind. How an
awareness of these principles of form could produce an experience of
beauty would need to be explored at the neurological level. for example,
by examining the connections between areas of the brain responsible
for fonn-construction and the emotional centres, specifically pleasure
centres, of the brain. However, for the purposes of this paper, it is
enough to consider how our way of thinking about beauty might be
changed, if the explanatory hypothesis presented in this paper were
true.
Representational theories of vision based on the belief that the
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output of visual processing is underdetermined in the proximal stimulus
usually envisage visual processing as stimulus-driven but supplemented
with innate assumptions. Marr posited that, embedded in the visual
system, there are rules or laws about the way forms are spatially
constructed. These are the rules that transform the retinocentric image
into an object-centred image in such a way that just one mental
description ofan object is constructed (duri ng the course ofperception)
regardless of its projected angle to the viewer. Marr emphasised that
these laws would be ahout the real world, understood as such presumably
because they would have evolved as a result of survival pressures on
the organism. for example. assumptions like 'all objects are rigid' or
'there are relatively few connected surfaces' .22 Such assumptions
would prompt a cenain transformation over another, and would be
automatic. mandatory and usually unconscious. Furthermore. as Frances
Egan points out:
It is important to note that these assumptions are not a<;sumed to he
explicitly represented in the visual system. The assumptions are
incorporated in the mechanism only in the following sense--the
mechanism operates in such a way that if the assumptions are true of
the subject's normal environment it will succeed in recovering
information about the environment from information in the image.2J
Marr observes that an occluding contour (like the boundary of a
silhouette) can provide enough information for us to recover the
geometry of a whole shape in generalised form. In an example of
reverse engineering, Marr reasons that three assumptions must be
built into the process for this to be possihle. These are: (i) each point
on the contour generator projects to a different point on the contour;
(ii) nearby points on the contour arise from nearby points on the
contour generator; and (iii) the contour generator lies wholly in a
single plane. The cognitive psychologist Ilona Roth points out that the
inbui It assumptions which Marr reasons must constrain the construction
of perceptual form are in line with Gestalt principles.24 The Gestalt
principles are the law of proximity. the law of similarity. the law of
good continuity. and the law of closure. These laws are manifestations
of the more basic Law of Pragnanz: 'Of several geometrically possible
organisations. that one will actually occur which possesses the best,
simplest and most stahle shape'. According to Roth. however. Gestalt
psychologists did not have the means to ac;cenain how these principles
might actually work. It has been left to experimental and computational
investigations to reinterpret perceptual grouping as a stage that operates
on simpler elements such as edge segments. initially extracted from
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the retinal image, and to posit the kind ofconstraints the system would
need to impose in order to achieve the transformation. Irvin Rock, in a
move which in hindsight can be interpreted as ahridge hetween Gestalt
principles and Marr's assumptions, points out that it is not the simplest
and most stahle shape that the system prefers, hut the simplest and
most stahle description underlying that shape, which in principle could
result in the most complicated shape being extracted, or constructed,
from the retinocentric image.25 According to Marr's model, shape
descriptions are constructed ofcylinders, principal axes (which provide
information ahout elongation and symmetry), and volumetric primitives
which are constructed around the axes. The assumptions involved in
selecting these elements from the image serve to make explicit the
organisation of the space occupied by an objcct and not just its visible
surfaces.26 Consider that adescription ofprincipal axes and volumetric
primitives would not contain information about the ohject seen from
only one angle (like the viewer-centred image) but would represent the
three-dimensional hierarchical decomposition of the object into
segments.
More recently the psychologist Irving Biederman has developed
the geon theory in which, instead of Marr's orientational and volu-
metric primitives, there are twenty-four volumetric primitives.27 These
primitives, as with those posited by Marr, can, according to the
philosopher Stephen Pinker, be thought of as a kind of 'dialect of
mentalese' : a visual language in terms of which all objects are
constructed and pcrccived.28 However Pinker, drawing upon
experiments he conducted with the psychologist Michael Tarr,
concluded that shape analysis is more likely to be a combination of
a number of different kinds of processes. The process might include
detecting geons, or mental rotation or matching with templates or
some combination of these. In addition, Pinker and Tarr found that
detecting dominant axes was a significant part of shape analysis (form
construction).29 In any case, it is sufficient for my purposes that there
is a perceptual process responsible for the construction of perceptual
form which we can think of as being constrained by certain inbuilt
assumptions or principles. As the above discussion bears out, it is quite
reasonable to assume this. The next task is to explore the possibility
that these underlying principles can be consciously accessible.
To ascertain whether or not such principles could be accessible, we
might first start with whether neural activity in the areas of the brain
responsible for form construction is accessible to consciousness.
Neuroscientists Francis Crick and Christoff Koch postulate that, unless
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a visual area has a direct projection to the frontal cortex, 'the activities
in that particular visual area will not enter visual awareness directly,
because the activity of the frontal areas is needed to allow a person to
report consciousness'. They continue:
All we are hypothesising is that the activity in V I [which provides the
dominant visual input to higher visual areas) does not directly enter
awareness. What docs enter awareness, we believe, is some form of the
neural activity in certain higher visual areas, hecause they project
directly to prefrontal areas.30
The process involved in constructing perceptual form is a high level
visual process. Crich and Koch's research, then, suggests that some
fonn of this activity can enter awareness. This is not to establish proof
for my second condition but merely to demonstrate that the evidence
emerging from neuroanatomical and psychophysical studies of vision
at present does not contravene the possibility that the principles
underlying the process of the construction of perceptual form are
accessible to consciousness (a mental state which has neither a
determinate concept nor a determinate perceptual analogue).3t
3.3 Perception and cognition: the third condition
The third condition is the possibility that perceptual principles could
figure, either analogously or in some parallel way, in higher level
judgments ofa cognitive lUnd. One way to envisage this as apossibility
is to imagine that perceptual fonn can be constructed not only from
bottom-up input into perceptual modules but also from top-down input
from cognitive systems into perceptual processes, even though we
would not experience the resulting representation as perceptual form
as such. In this way, not only the relation between sensory or perceptual
aspects of objects, but also the relation between concepts could count
towards an experience of beauty. An example of the lUnd of evidence
needed in order to assume this can be found in the work of the cognitive
psychologists Michael Posner and Marcus Raichle. They drew upon
experiments conducted on people using Positron Emission Tomo-
graphy. They found that a signal that has left the areas of the brain
responsible for higher level perceptual processes can re-enter that area
from centres responsible for higher level cognitive tasks.32 That is,
high level perceptual processes can operate on input that enters from
cognitive centres of the brain rather than only on input that has entered
through the specialised perceptual input channels. Another example
is the work of the psychologists Dehorah Chambers and Daniel
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Reisberg.Their results support the notion that high-level perceptual
processes are responsible for mental imagery. which is a kind of
representation that can be involved in high level cognitive tasks.33 At
this point, then, we can speculate that intellectual beauty can be
accommodated by an explanatory hypothesis of beauty in which the
experience of beauty is constituted hy an awareness ofcertain perceptual
principles in the course of perceiving/apprehending certain objects!
constructs.
4. Beauty and Art
4.1 Visual Art and Beauty
We can further speculate about the way in which the relevant perceptual
principles. prompted by certain objective characteristics in the object.
need to be employed in order to be brought to our attention. Perhaps
certain relations in the ohject, in the course ofbeing perceived. challenge
or stretch the relevant perceptual principles in an unprecedented or
non-typical way. On the other hand, the relation of the elements within
some objects, such as natural forms (and certain artworks. for example.
the sculptures of Constantin Brancusi. 1876 -1957). might epitomise
the perceptual principles. Perhaps when the principles are invoked in
any way which is likely to draw our attention from straight-forward
object recognition to the process of perception as a solution to a
problem, then we are experiencing beauty. That is. when it is as if the
very process of perception itself is experienced as a resolution of
tensions or a solution to the problem of constructing a coherent form
from an array of primitives. then we experience beauty.
The contemporary Australian painter Jeffrey Smart34 sets up the
visual elements in such a way that our search for a visual resolution
is always rewarded, but not without some tension along the way. The
fact that he uses everyday objects like street signs. road markings
and trucks in his paintings to set up these purely visual symphonies
does not dull the visual challenge; the solutions emerge from the
relations between the visual elements (ohjects). The way the elements
are arranged in his paintings gives rise to one unified configuration.
According to the vision-scientist Glyn Humphreys. there is a difference
between the processes and principles involved in observing 'within
object relations' 35 and those exercised in perceiving 'between object
relations' . The former are such that. when detected. the system perceives
the elements so related as cohering within a discrete object rather than
as elements of different objects. Perhaps a painter like Smart contrives
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relations between objects in his paintings that mimic 'within object
relations' and that is why the perceptual principles employed come to
our attention and cause a disinterested pleasure. even though we are
not aware of the basis of this pleasure. 'Within object relations' are
those that give rise to aunified whole. When acomposition is set up to
mimic this unity between representations of objects. this would count
as an unusual employment of these principles, an unusual solution to
the problem ofperception. and hence we become aware of the perception
of the painting as a solution.
It might be objected. however. that while various cultures do seem
to offer a universal experience of certain aesthetic constants, at the
same time they can be said to have their own unique aesthetic. For
example. we can look at African sculptures, Japanese tea ceremonies
and Byzantine religious icons although, while we can enjoy their
perceptual beauty. we may not be able to experience their intellectual
beauty in the way that someone whose worldview was saturated by the
outlook exemplified in these works could. If there were a constant
perceptual kind ofheauty and a dynamic intellectual component to the
experience ofbeauty, the latter would explain the aspects of aculture's
aesthetic which are inaccessible to the uninitiated.
My hunch is that purely perceptual beauty is caused by a particular
relation between objective properties of the object and certain species-
specific perceptual principles and. as such, can be understood to be
universal. Perhaps, though. the kind of relations between perceptual
elements which give rise to a unified whole can be experienced
analogously between the elements of a conceptual construct. This
kind of apprehension could vary considerably in complexity, from the
notion of a balanced approach to what a particular culture understands
as the necessary components of a good life to the experience of
mathematical beauty. Intellectual beauty, from scientific beauty to
moral beauty. would demand a shared background of knowledge or a
shared worldview.
An example of a visual art form which evokes a response to
perceptual and intellectual beauty. although certain of its culturally
embedded intellectual connotations may well be largely inaccessible
to Western minds, is Australian aboriginal art. Although one unfamiliar
with the particular aboriginal culture would not understand the work in
the way a member of the particular aboriginal group would, one could
still respond to its perceptual form and certain aspects ofits intellectual
form. Imagine an art critic who has no knowledge of the traditional
art and culture of the Australian Aboriginal. Although she would not
17
Literature and Aesthetics
understand the work in the same way as would a person from the
relevant cultural group, would not understand the exact meanings,
interpretations or value placed upon the work as amemberofthegroup
would, there would still be a common level of experience of the work.
The critic might, on studying, for example, the work of Emily Kame
Kngwarreye (1910-1996) called Ntange Dreaming (1989),36 notice
fine, carefully spaced marks,lines and dots, which she might experience
as sensitively balanced and counterbalanced throughout the work. Yet
shifting her focus to the way that the various earth tones and white and
black are juxtaposed gives the impression of a fluctuation in relative
weightings, which results in an ungraspable, unpredictable configuration
of movements not only across the picture plane but backwards and
forwards into the pictorial space. This configuration must confound
the assumptions posed by Marr as somehow represented in the visual
system that 'surfaces are continuous' and 'objects are solid'. Further
prolonged contemplation of Kngwarreye's work can result in an
involuntary shift in perception from moving dots to tonal groupings
which result in the emergence of broadly defined shapes. But it is
impossible to hold this configuration indefinitely. No sooner has
this configuration appeared than it is lost again to an energetic array
of exalted dots. Enough basic visual primitives (dots, edges, tones,
textures) are provided to occupy our visual system in a search for form
which is continually tantalised but never permanently satisfied.
The configurations which we apprehend-from the slow throbbing
movement of individual marks and dots across the picture plane to the
virtual lines and shapes, which when configured bring a temporary
stillness to the work-are constructed by our form-making principles
as they search (normall y unconsciously) for contours, and orientational
and volumetric primitives. The uninitiated critic, the Ahoriginal artist
and her cultural community can all agree at this level, hecause this
level of perceptual interaction with the world is universal. What
involves the intellect of a post-modern viewer is the dynamic nature of
the configurations. The harmony and balance of the work seem tenuous
and unstable: it is as if the painting's harmonies are revealed in real
time but can be missed if the various possihle configurations are not
perceived. This is not the static balance of a High Renaissance painting,
nor the delicate overtures in the direction of balance of a traditional
Japanese landscape; rather it is arhythmic, throbbing, dynamic balance
which challenges more established aesthetic canons.
This is not to claim that all artefacts are made to serve the same
purpose or evoke the same meanings, or even to claim that all people
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can overcome concerns extraneous to t1le experience of beauty. If
one's mind-set is t1lat art is for complementing Edwardian furnishings,
traditional tribal art might appear an aberration, as it did for t1le middle
classes when first introduced to African art in t1le early twentiet1l
century. On t1le other hand, if you believe t1lat the only art forms
relevant to our age are installation and multi-media art, t1len traditional
art forms will be perceived as aesthetically unrewarding. Another
obstacle to aest1letic appreciation can be if an art object's message or
percei ved meani ng arouses the viewer's anger or disgust to asignificant
degree. When this happens, it is unlikely t1lat t1le viewer will be able to
experience t1le work's perceptual beauty, because t1le attention will be
arrested by t1le literal meaning of t1le work.
When t1le relations within an object in t1le course ofbeing perceived
violate t1le normal operations of perceptual principles, perhaps by not
providing a stimulus which can lead to t1le construction of a coherent
form, t1len we might experience t1le object as ugly. However, some
artworks designed to evade perceptual form construction can manage
to elude ugliness. Jackson Pollock's Blue Poles (1952) entrances t1le
eye with its skeins of paint secmingly on the move across t1le picture
plane and, to some extent, into the pictorial space, such are t1le varying
tonal weights oft1le overlapping dribbles and splashes ofcolour. But it
does not offer a solution to the construction of form; t1lere is no
resolution of spatial tensions. Instead, t1le work keeps us at t1le level of
t1le purely sensuous; pleasurable in t1le same way as physical pleasures
but not t1le same as t1le disinterested pleasure of t1le experience of
beauty.
There are many extra-aest1letic reasons for various fashions. A
t1leory of beauty need not cover all fashions, nor t1le way we enjoy all
artworks for t1lat maner, because t1lere are many other factors in human
experience that can inform and drive such preferences and activities.
Maori tattoos and the elongated lips and necks of certain African tribes
are associated with high status; this is partly why t1ley are looked upon
wit1l approval by members of their communities. There are a number
of speculations as to why such trends took offin the first place but they
need not concern a t1leory of beauty.
It is possible for a work which arouses our response to beauty
through its perceptual form not to provide us wit1l the phenomeno-
logically more complete beauty experience, which is a combination of
relations emerging within and between its perceptual form and
conceptual content. It may be t1lat t1le work simply doesn't provide t1le
opportunity for t1le latter, or it may be t1lat t1le viewer does not share t1le
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same worldvicw or metaphysical/aesthetic canons as the artist. which
would preclude her from experiencing its intellectual beauty. For
example. Impressionism can be aligned with an increasingly secular,
analytical worldview, newly forrning within an increasingly atomistic
analysis of experience. As contemporary aesthetics moves towards a
more holistic worldview. Impressionism can appear naive or thwarted
in its attempt to capture experience. Cubism has often. if somewhat
flippantly. been understood as the artistic expression of relativity. It is
probably better aligned with quantum mechanics, a fracturing of the
classic scienti fic deterministic worldview. While many artworks demand
both a perceptual and intellectual engagement (the relations in the
intellectual construct paralleling the relations between the perceptual
components). some artworks reward one kind of engagement rather
than the other with an experience of beauty.
Intellectual constructs are beautiful when they are balanced.
harmonious and unified. or achieve 'unity in variety'. to take the
Hutchesonian line. but our notions of what constitutes these qualities
can and do change and develop. A voiding feature of intellectual
beauty is unilluminating ideas.37 or ideas that are too general or
obvious. What counts towards these voiding features will also change
over time. within the individual's and the society's life. The point to be
made here is this: the fact that not all art evokes an experience ofbeauty
is no more a threat to the possibility of beauty than the fact that not all
mathematical and scientific theories evoke a response to beauty. The
intellectual beauty component of art. and of scientific, mathematical
theories is dynamic; it may take time for the public. and often those
more established in the particular field, to catch up.38 Furthermore,
the degree to which an artwork prompts one to respond intellectually
to it rather than just perceptually is the degree to which its beauty
will be dynamic and relative, rather than constant and universal.
4.2 Other forms of An, and Beauty
The outline ofan explanation ofbeauty presented in this paper assumes
that beauty supervenes on the formal relations among and between the
perceptual properties and/or the concepts of an object/construct. I have
discussed above the idea of form in relation to visual art. What can we
mean, however. when we talk about the aesthetic foml of a poem.
novel. sonata or film?
Monroe Beardsley in his consideration of form in Iiterature39
discusses what he understands as all the possible elements which make
20
Jennifer McMahon
up literary form. He includes both the phonetic and semantic aspects.
He di vides these further into sound textures (details of sound changes,
relations between sounds), sound structures (structures definable in
terms of sound rather than meaning, e.g. the sonnet), meaning textures
(meanings of certain words, phrases, sentences and paragraphs) and
meaning structures (plot, that is, the sequence of events considered in
the order in which they occurred rather than the order in which they are
narrated, which is what is known as the story). These categories can be
further dissected and elaborated, and Beardsley does this, describing
language forms such as qualities, diction, syntax, patterns and verbal
designs.
Now, for meaning structure, Beardsley makes further illuminating
distinctions: the structure of a literary work is the large-scale relation-
ships within the work, the major connections.40 He singles out logical,
narrative and dramatic structures. Logical structures are made up of
relationships connecting episodes, relationships that are evidential,
consequential, definitive or deductive. Narrative structure refers to
relationships within the plot-the numher ofepisodes or sequences of
episodes, the story lines or plots and sub-plots-the parallels or contrasts
between them (for example, they may have a complex, scattered
movement or a direct, repetitive motion). Dramatic structure refers to
regional qualities ofmovement-that is, the kinetic pattern, ifyou like,
such as the building and relaxation of tension-variations in the on-
goingness of the work, its pace and momentum. He further analyses the
dramatic structure into episodes or sections ofdiscourse with either an
Introductory Quality (the preliminaries, the setting up of a scene),
Exhibition Quality (the body of the piece) and the Conclusion Quality
(the winding up). Further structures he discusses are perspectival
structures (relationship between speaker and his situation) and
developmental structures (where the situation or the speaker's attitude
changes in some way).
An important part of the form of literature is the set of relations
established between the dominant ideas or, in some cases, the images
created and the subordinate ideas/images-the themes which emerge
and the relation between these-developments, changes, contrasts,
parallels. What Beardsley refers to as 'the kinetic curve' of a literary
work may largely be mapped as developments to, and from, scenes of
greater or less climax: 'the reversal, the confrontation, the revelation,
the showdown, the death' .41 The pattern of episodes created may be
sequential, and logical: a smooth continuous rise and fall of tension
where the sequence is in some way expected or looked forward to. Or
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it may have a more disjointed feel, when possible interpretations are
invited and are multifarious, giving a more unexpected, difficult to
grasp overall structure to the work. In some works the unity sought will
be continually frustrated: the work will arouse notions of unity even if
only by drawing the reader's attention to the unity expected but not
revealed. What this unity refers to is the aesthetic form of literature.
The aesthetic form is constructed over time. Consider the time it takes
to read a literary work, the gaps between the reading times and so on.
Grasping the form occurs with the apprehension of the plot/s, the
apprehension of the intricacies and complexities ofthe various elements
of structure. If we re-engage with the story on returning to it after a
break, we also set up the elements of structure. How well we apprehend
the form will depend on the quality of our engagement with the work.
Certain contemporary literary styles only inti mate the structure, leaving
it to the reader to fill in the details of interpretation which the reader
normally does in a trial and error way until a unity of meaning is
revealed. Literary works can challenge aesthetic canons or stabilise
emerging ones through habituation just as other art forms and new
scientific theories can.
Absolute music presents an example of an art form which can be
experienced either as perceptual beauty, or as a combination of both
perceptual and intellectual beauty. Certain philosophers of music
imply that there is only one way validly to experience the beauty of
music and that is perceptualIy. According to Peter Kivy, the musical
work's structure is its essential characteristic. Various renditions or
interpretations of the work can still be judged to be that work according
to the degree to which the same relative sounds within the performance
are achieved.42 Others insist that both form and content can contribute
to music's beauty but then proceed to conflate content with form.
Eduard Hanslick believed that the content ofmusic was tonally moving
forms.43 The explanation of structure in literary works described by
Beardsley, the various kinds of passages and how they are related,
particularly his notions of introductory, exhibition and conclusive
quality, and his idea of dominant and subordinate themes can all be
applied analogously to musical structure. Some theorists discuss this
form in anthropomorphic terminology such as tension, climax, release.
In any case, the idea that beauty is to be found in the aesthetic form of
the work is easily applied to music. At the psychological level, however,
to treat musical beauty as having a perceptual component in the same
way as visual beauty requires that the auditory perceptual module is set
up in an analogous way to vision. The philosopher Diana Raffman
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treats auditory processing thus when developing an explanation of
musical nuance ineffability.44
Probably the most difficult art form to think of in terms of aesthetic
form is performance. for example. theatre and opera. In order for such
performances to be viewed as beautiful requires a concentrated
synthesis ofboth perceptual and intellectual relationships. The coherence
of the meanings constructed within the temporal unity which is
the performance and their relation to their extensions outside the
performance provides the basis from which the audience construct or
apprehend the aesthetic form of the work.45 In an analogous way. the
viewer constructs l1le aesthetic form of l1le various contemporary
branches of the visual arts: performance art. holograms. installation
pieces and virtual realities.
5. Conclusion
I have given an outline of how a unified theory of beauty might be
developed.
The unified form which l1le perceptual process gives to the array of
sensations it picks up is the source ofour experience of beauty. That is.
when we experience beauty we are actually becoming aware of the
processes which solve the problem ofpcrception. Hence. the experience
of beauty has neither a determinate perceptual analogue nor a
determinate concept.
If beauty is an experience of the principles involved in the con-
struction of perceptual form and these principles are employed in a
universal way for any particular form. we can say l1lat purely perceptual
beauty is universal and relatively unchanging. That is. the way the
perceptual principles are epitomised or challenged will be universal.
Intellectual beauty. on the other hand. is not so automatic. In order to
appreciate intellectual beauty. one must have l1le appropriate grasp of
the concepts involved. Hence. it is unlikely that intellectual beauty can
significantly transcend cultural. experiential harriers. Furthermore. the
kind of relations between concepts which give rise to harmony and
unity. for example. the amount of tension that can be tolerated before
aconstruct is no longer beautiful. will be relative to cultures. individuals
and even to stages throughout the one person's lifetime. According to
this theory. heauty can be either predominantly perceptual or both
perceptual and cognitive. and the degree to which perceptual beauty
dominates the experience will be the degree to which a judgment of
beauty can be considered to be universal and necessary.
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In order to understand aesthetic form or beauty, we ought not to
think of the configuration itself as the source of beauty, but the way the
perceptual processes underlying form construction have been employed
in the process ofpcrcciving the objcct which stimulates the experience
of beauty. That is, the source of heauty is the experience of perceptual
processes solving the problem ofpcrception of which we only become
aware when the principles underlying this perceptual process are
challenged or epitomised. Thinking of the experience of heauty in this
way resolves the apparent dichotomies surrounding our understanding
of beauty. In particular. it explains that peculiar phenomenology of
beauty which leads us to the 'universal. unchanging-relative. dynamic'
dichotomy.
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